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Sclove: Evidence--Res Gestae--Suicide Notes
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
lessee. The stipulation as to forfeiture in the agreement was for
the purpose of securing to S the payment of the rental during the
years the lease was to continue. If P could have the forfeiture set
aside he would have a fair chance to establish his claim on the final
hearing. As a general rule equity will set aside a forfeiture for
the non-payment of rent where compensation can be made.' In
West Virginia specific provision is made for relief from a forf6iture for non-payment of rent,' and in a recent case relief from
such forfeiture was granted in which the court relied definitely
on this statutory provision.0 Thus it appears that P might secure
relief from the forfeiture and in order to secure his interests it
would seem that the injunction should not have been dissolved.
c H. BARNETT.
-FRmE

Res Gestae - SUicmDE NoTEs. - In a suit on a
war risk insurance policy, the beneficiaries contended that C, the
veteran insured therein, disappeared from his Norfolk home on
January 8, 1921, and died before the lapse of the policy on March
1, 1921. C left his employer's office on the morning of January
8 with a man who had just shown him a paper and had given him
a short time on the same day within which to make good some
obligation. In the afternoon mail, C's wife received a suicide note
dated that morning.' Later a man was seen by a boy to leave his
coat on a bridge platform twenty miles from Norfolk and to walk
away. The boy took the coat home and in its pocket found a second
note which was forwarded to the wife within the week and which
EVIDENCE -

such answers, ought to have dissolved the injunction if, as was the case, the
allegations of the bill were unsupported by proof. It is true there are
various exceptions to this general rule as where the plaintiff would lose all
the benefit which would otherwise accrue to him should he finally succeed in
the cause, or where the facts disclosed by the bill and answer afford strong
presumption that the plaintiff will establish his claim for relief on the
parol hearing, and it appears that he will suffer great and immediate injury by a dissolution of the injunction, or when a dissolution of the injunction would in effect amount to a complete denial of the relief sought."
v. Knight, 12 W. Va. 667, 683 (1878).
Shonk
8
Wheeling & E. G. Ry. Co. v. Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 516, 52 S. E.
499, 511 (1905); Spies v. Ry. Co., 60 W. Va. 389, 55 S. E. 464 (1906);
Pheasant v. Hanna, 63 W. Va. 613, 60 S. E. 618 (1908); South Penn Oil Co.
v. Edgell, 48 W. Va. 348, 37 S. E. 596, 86 Am. St. Rep. 43 (1900); Lynch v.
Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 165 Pa. St. 518, 30 Atl. 984 (1895).
9 W. VA. RLv. CoDn (1931) c. 37, art. 20, § 6.
'" Beech Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas Corporation, 109 W. Va. 39, 152 S.

E.785 (1930).

' This note, signed "Billie", simply told of intended suicide.
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read: "Have taken Cyanide of Potash and jumped in the River
ending a wasted life every one will be better off by my passing
out". The wife could not positively identify, as her husband, a
body found along the North Carolina seashore several months
later. Held, that the two notes were properly admitted in evidence
either as a part of the res gestae tending to prove a time of death
prior to the lapse of the policy, or under another hearsay exception
"closely akin to res gestae" as statements of intention; and that
the other evidence tended to establish C's death. United States v.

O'Brien?
The res gestae doctrine has been correctly and vigorously
criticized, judicially and otherwise, because it is vague, useless
and even harmful.' A declaration, admissible under this doctrine,
must characterize and be contemporaneous with a principal nonverbal act, independently established;' but, while giving lipservice to the requirement of contemporaneity, the courts have
stretched the doctrine beyond recognition.' The principal case
illustrates the continued reluctance of courts to break away from
this unfortunate phrase.' Although giving the alternative ground
for the admissibility of the notes as statements of intent, citing
'It was signed with the insured's full name.
'51 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
"'It is useless, because every rule of evidence to which it has ever been
applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with
another and thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of both. It ought
therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology." 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1904) §§ 1795-97; Hardman, Spontaneowu Exclamationw v. Res Gestae (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 341; (1921) 28 W. VA. L.
Q. 155; People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908).
5WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1904) §§ 1753, 1754, 1756.
8 Supra n. 5. Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S. E. 28
(1918) (declaration admitted as part of res gestae made immediately on
recovery of consciousness although some time after an explosion; the court
also quoted Mr. Wigmore's language with reference to spontaneous exclamations.)
' The res gestae doctrine is applied in the following cases: Ambrose v.
Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S. E. 810 (1925) (declaration of car driver on
scene of collision within 20 minutes after accident that he was driving 45
miles per hour at a point 1/8 mile from place of collision, admissible);
Wallace v. Prichard, 92 W. Va. 352, 115 S. E. 415 (1922) (where broker,
verbally surrendering previous contract, agreed owner could deal directly
with customer in consideration of owner's agreement to pay stipulated compensation, original contract admissible); DePue v. Steber, 89 W. Va. 78,
108 S. E. 590 (1921) (declaration of alleged donee that a ring had been
given to him, made on day of alleged gift and very soon afterwards but
not at place thereof, not admissible; but declarations of ownership of
property while in his possession are admissible); Robertson v. Ry. Co., 87
W. Va. 106, 104 S. E. 615 (1920) (decedent's declaration when removed
from beneath cars that on entering tracks he looked and saw no train in
either direction admissible); Blagg v. Ry. Co., 83 W. Va. 449, 98 S. E. 526
(1919) (engineer's statement just after accident that he saw decedent in
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the famous Hillmon case,8 the decision creates the impression that
the emphasis is in justifying the admissibility under the res
gestae exception. In fact, the syllabus speaks only of res gestae.
The difficulty in applying the res gestae doctrine appears in
the very opinion of the court. To the contention that to admit
these notes under that doctrine is to allow the independent fact of
death, which the notes are to explain, to be proved by the notes
themselves, the court answers: "We do not think that the admission of the notes on the res gestae doctrine is limited
to any
such narrow view". Narrow or not, the contention was sound,
for the other evidence to establish death was rather slight.' Moreover, to say the notes were "written shortly before actual suicide"
is to assume a knowledge of the precise time of the alleged suicide.
Finally, the court refers to the notes as spontaneous statements,
remarking that they were "written when the insured was in the
act of leaving his home and business and when shown to be in
financial and perhaps criminal difficulty". 1 Despite the court's
express statement to the contrary," spontaneity has no applicatracks and blew for him but he did not seem to hear alarm apparently because of another passing train admissible); Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co.,
supra n.6; Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. Virginia-Western Power Co., 81 W.
Va. 298, 94 S.E. 372 (1917) (statement of defendant's lineman immediately
after power house appiratus indicated three short circuits that wires were
tangled up and that plant must be shut down admissible); Stone v. Campbell's Creek Ry. Co., 66 W. Va. 417, 66 S. E. 521 (1909) (engineer's statement to boy jumping from train and run over by it, made 3 or 4 minutes
after injury, admissible); Sample v. Consolidated Ry. Co., 50 W. Va. 472, 40
S. E. 694 (1901) (motorman's declaration made while still on deceased
child's body admissible); Deck v. Tabler, 41 W. Va. 332, 23 S.E. 721 (1895)
(husband's declarations admissible to show his intention in making gift or
settlement and to raise resulting trust); Hawker v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 15 W.
Va. 628 (1879) (engineer's statement one hour after accident and several
hundred yards away not admissible); Corder v. Talbot, 14 W. Va. 277
(1878) (husband's statements to wife concerning his conversation with a
man just few minutes prior thereto not admissible); Beckwith v. Mollohan,
2 W. Va. 477 (1868) (defendant's declarations at time of tying plaintiff's
hands
forcibly as to reasons therefor admissible).
8
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 255, 12 S. Ct. 909

(1892).

.Supra n.1, at 40.
10Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 397 (1869), declarations of
insured decedent that he had fallen down stairs and injured himself admitted as part of res gestae. Maguire, The Hillmon Case--Thirty.Threo
Years After (1925) 38 H~Av. L. REV. 708, 712, n. 16, similarly criticizes this
case because other evidence tending to prove a fall was slight or entirely
lacking.
nSupra n. 1, at 40.
Supra n. 1, at 41. Such confusion of the res gestac and spontaneous exclamation doctrines exists in our own cases. Ambrose v. Young, supra n.7, at
458; Blagg v. By. Co., supra n. 7, at 453; Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co,,
supra n. 7, at 600.
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tion to res gestae; it is the requisite of an exception for spontaneous exclamations which Mr. Wigmore has substituted for the
res gestae doctrine.' Besides the evidence was quite vague as to
the exact nature of the threatened prosecution, if any, so that it
may be said that there was not a sufficiently clear startling occurrence under the influence of which the notes would gather unto themselves trustworthiness within the spontaneous exclamation
exception."4
The two suicide notes were clearly admissible under the hearsay exception for statements of present existing intention or
state of mind.' So limited, the statements must refer to future
acts." The second note here was couched in the past tense but
under the circumstances it must certainly have indicated an intention to do a future act.' No difficulties are encountered, for
the notes come in as independently material evidence of intention
and the inquiry to establish the fact of death has no bearing on
admissibility as it would seem to have under the res gestae doctrine.' It is difficult to understand why a court, which in the
same opinion recognizes the rather easily applied doctrine of the
Hillmon case,1" should struggle with the unsound res gestae doctrine.

-Bxmwn

u ScLovF.

3 WIGMORE, EVIDENc E (1904) §§ 1745-60.
certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of
nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous
and sincere response to actual sensations and perceptions already produced
by the external shock." 3 WiG orx, EVIDENCE (1904) § 1747. Besides the
fact that a startling occurrence was not clearly established, it would also
seem that a threatened prosecution is not strictly within the above rule. For
a typical case within the rule, involving an explosion, see Starcher v. South
Penn Oil Co., supra n. 7.
15Prof. Wigmore anticipates the present case, characterizing the use of
res gestae here as the wrong reason for a correct conclusion. 3 WiGoMRE,
EVIDENCE (1904) § 1726(2); State v. Hayward, 62 Minn 474, 65 N. W. 63
(1895).
"3 WIar0RE, EVIDEN E (1904) §§ 1725-34. The doctrine of the Hillmon
case has been criticized by Hutchins and Slesinger, State of Mind to Prove
An Act (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 283, making a logical extension of the doctrine
to admit statements of present existing state of mind to prove past and
present facts as well, when corroborated; see also Seligman, An Rzception to
the Hearsay Bule (1912) 26 HAxv. L. REV. 146; Maguire, The Hllmon CaseThirty-Three
Years After, supra n. 10.
"7 The court so considered it. Supra n. 1, at 39.
op. cit. sipra n. 15.
2sWIGaORE,
10
Supra n. 8.
4"Under
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